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Abstract 
In response to climate change, many electric utilities introduce pricing schemes to induce their customers to consume 
less electricity. When a significant portion of the consumer population finds it more costly to economize electricity, 
one would expect utilities to offer incentives in return for lower usage of electricity. The model put forward in this 
paper enhances understanding of why a typical electric utility may instead prefer to increase prices, in so doing 
discriminating against environmentally conscious customers. This result holds even when the utility is charged for its 
greenhouse gas emissions. But in this case the price increase is sufficiently small to induce energy savings also from 
customers for whom there is a net cost in doing so.
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1. Introduction 
In line with general concerns about climate change, consumers are being urged to save 
energy resources. Many studies confirm that appropriate incentives need to take into account 
not only households’ financial constraints but also demand inertia (Department of Energy & 
Climate Change, 2009). Some structural strategies have therefore been implemented in a bid 
to make energy conservation more attractive to households (Steg, 2008). One strand of the 
literature focuses on the opportunities afforded by digital communication technologies and 
time-variable tariffs (Wall and Crosbie, 2009; Kiesling, 2008). Another strategy is to increase 
the cost of energy through taxes on household consumption of fossil fuels, yet consumption 
rates remain controversial as evidenced in the current debate in France (Kanter and Saltmarch, 
2009). Finally, many governments have policies to promote more efficient product choices, 
such as a combination of labeling and fee-rebates offered in relation to energy-efficient 
appliances (David Suzuki Foundation, 2007). 
In this paper we focus on price-oriented mechanisms via which electricity utilities 
introduce new tariffs aimed at reducing electricity use. In this respect, one concrete example 
deserves some comment. When the French residential electricity market was opened to 
competition, new entrant retailer Poweo introduced an innovative time-of-use tariff with 
discounted running charges for new customers provided they did not consume more than a 
contracted amount. Yet two years or so later, Poweo removed this attractive scheme. This 
decision suggests either that Poweo’s tariff was merely a means of attracting customers or that 
its new customers spent more on electricity than they had budgeted for, despite their apparent 
desire to control electricity use.  
Reversing the pricing practice leads to an increase in the electricity price at higher 
consumption levels. To mention a few examples, in 2008 one Canadian utility (BC Hydro, 
2008) introduced a block-inclining tariff (overall revenue-neutral), similar to that faced by 
most Californian electricity consumers (Reiss and White, 2005). Such tariffs also exist in 
Japan, where Tokyo Electric Power Company’s customers subscribe to the monthly Meter-
Rate Lighting tariff. Households are thus charged the first 120 kWh at ¥17.87/kWh (nearly 20 
cents at January 2010’s exchange rates), increasing 23% up to 300 kWh, and a further 5% 
above that level. This tends to suggest that penalizing pricing structures could be an efficient 
tool for inducing energy conservation. For example, Thaler and Sustein (2009, p. 40) assert 
that energy conservation methods framed in terms of losses are effective nudges because most 
people are loss averse.  
Overall, these pricing strategies suggest that the structure of electricity tariffs must 
inevitably adapt to the need to induce consumers to reduce their electricity use. There are 
several reasons to believe that traditional structures such as flat rates (the amount paid is 
strictly proportional to consumption), simple two-part tariffs (the amount decreases with 
consumption) and block-declining rates do not seem appropriate to inciting consumers to 
control their electricity consumption behavior. 
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The present paper puts forward a theoretical model for analyzing the pricing policy of an 
independent electric utility when its objective is to induce customers to conserve energy. Our 
analysis assumes that there is a continuum of consumers whose differentiated attitudes 
towards electricity saving decision may be likened to the cost of switching between two 
brands (Chen, 1997; Klemperer, 1987). A central finding here is that a “first-best” optimum 
exists whereby only those consumers who attach a ‘positive’ value to environmental 
protection are charged for energy conservation. This result holds even when the firm is 
charged directly for its greenhouse gas emissions. In this case, the firm charges a lower 
penalty so as to induce energy saving from that fraction of its customers for whom there is a 
net cost in doing so.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: section 2 supports the assumption that 
reducing energy consumption involves behavioral costs; section 3 provides our model; while 
section 4 discusses the policy implications of the results and possible directions for future 
research. 
2. Barriers to household energy saving 
Environmental economics literature is replete with empirical studies looking at the barriers 
to investment in demand-reducing equipment, such as Banfi et al. (2008) for residential 
building, and Wall and Crosbie (2009) for electricity demand reduction in lighting. Though 
not directly related to energy saving, Taylor (1975) provides an earlier reference where habit 
formation is suggested as an explanation for the small value of own-price elasticity estimates 
in the short run. More recently, Maréchal (2009) surveys the energy economics literature 
concerning habits as an important factor explaining the limited effectiveness of policy-driven 
energy saving incentives. This is supported by empirical evidence from Japan showing that 
most customers do not care a great deal about their electricity expenses because its use is an 
everyday activity (Yamamoto et al., 2008). Even in the longer run, purchases of energy-
efficient appliances may not lead to a reduction in energy demand. One mechanism 
underlying this effect is called the “direct rebound effect”. It is such that “[i]mproved energy 
efficiency for a particular energy service will decrease the effective price of that service 
[which] leads to an increase in consumption of that service.” (Sorrell and Dimitropoulos, 
2008, p. 637). 
Few of the studies however provide a theoretical framework to underpin the empirical 
evidence. Brennan (2009) considers the plight of consumers who do not bother to take 
advantage of energy efficiency investment because of incomplete information or inability to 
translate that information into beneficial action (supporting evidence of such barriers is found 
in Banfi et al., 2008). In Brennan’s model, a fraction of consumers chooses not to invest 
despite the fact that they would be better off doing so. One rationale for this may be 
consumers’ low awareness of the energy efficiency of electricity-using appliances (Yamamoto 
et al, 2008; Steg, 2008 and see the references therein). Another reason might be that electricity 
is invisible, meaning that consumers do not know when they are using a lot of it (Thaler and 
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Sustein, 2009, p. 206). Although we concur with these factors, here we take a different 
approach to that of Brennan who considers transport rather than switching costs.  
In the following model, ‘under-saving’ in energy may simply reflect a transaction cost akin 
to the cost of switching between two identical products. One reason for this kind of inertia 
could be people’s desire to reduce cognitive dissonance or the psychic ‘cost’ of being exposed 
to information which undermines the logic of maintaining current consumption behaviors (see 
Akerlof and Dickens, 1982 who seem to be the earliest reference importing this kind of 
psychological in the economics literature). For example, it is likely that consumers who 
discard a potentially energy-saving tariff and tend to go along with their default tariff simply 
want to avoid the discomfort of learning how much they could have saved on their bill. 
Another possible barrier to energy saving is the existence of efforts of optimizing under 
different tariffs (Train, 1994). As that author asserted, such efforts essentially represent the 
time and cost of learning about a tariff. 
3. Pricing policy when consumers have different attitudes towards the environment 
Rather than attempting to consider the potential for energy savings via investment in 
energy-efficient technologies or via technology substitution, we instead try to focus on 
electricity waste reduction. We assume identical customers who use an amount of electricity 
equal to (1 + )∗ , where /(1 + )  is the fraction of electricity used that is wasted. 
Wastefulness in this model arises from the related assumption that consumers only derive a 
satisfaction from the services they actually use. Therefore, the utility of consuming (1 + )∗
 
is equal to that of consuming ∗. Formally, there is a reference-level utility each consumer 
derives from consuming the services she actually uses. It is constant and denote by 	∗. 
Consumers are in a continuum of measure 1, each of whom and is characterized by the cost 
of reducing his or her consumption from (1 + )∗  to ∗ . Here, the cost of reducing 
electricity consumption is a fixed cost per unit of electricity saved, akin to the cost of 
switching between brands of products that are in all other respects undifferentiated. As 
suggested in Klemperer (1987, footnote 6, p. 378), in our single-period model, the role of 
consumer switching cost is quite similar to horizontal product differentiation. We prefer to 
consider those ‘transportation costs’ (as per Klemperer), as wasted and non wasted electricity 
are exactly the same products. However, unlike Choe and Fraser (1999) and almost all papers 
on consumer switching costs, this cost can be negative. We denote it by 
. The rationale for 
our weaker assumption is that 
 is a gross cost of spending time or effort in saving energy less 
the value attached to protection of the environment. This ‘net cost’ could be for example the 
psychological cost of turning off the lights in unoccupied rooms less the value attached to 
such action. For consumers who have a negative attitude towards the environment, the 
difference is positive whereas it is negative for environmentally conscious consumers. This 
assumption borrows from Green (2000) who models competition between electricity retailers 
when consumers face switching costs. He distinguishes between the consumer’s cost of 
switching from the incumbent and the added value of buying from a new entrant. But the 
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difference between them is assumed to be always positive in Green’s model. 
 is thus an 
independent realization of a random variable  that is uniformly distributed on [−, ] for 
convenience, where  > 0 and greater than . We further consider that as electricity is used at 
the very instant it is transmitted to consumers, they cannot engage in resale. 
Let  and  denote the unit and standing charges of the old tariff. The firm introduces an 
optional tariff (,  − ), where  is a discount payment offered to customers who switch to 
this optional tariff provided they reduce their consumption to the level ∗. In the remaining of 
the paper we set  ≡ 0 as this variable does not enter into any of the results.1 By introducing 
this new tariff, the firm can price discriminate between customers who will sort themselves 
depending on the costs faced in saving electricity. 	∗,  and 
 are in monetary terms and we 
assume that 	∗ > ∗. To capture universal service in electricity, we finally assume that 
market size is given and equal to 2. 
 
Case 1 (all consumers switch). A first interesting solution is to determine the discount 
payment ∗ such that all customers reduce their consumption to ∗. Let us first write the 
consumer program. A consumer is indifferent as between switching to the new energy-saving 
tariff and continuing to waste electricity if 
  is such that 	∗ − ∗ + − 
∗ = 	∗ −
(1 + )∗, which leads to 
 =  +/∗ ≡ 
̃(). As a consequence, all consumers whose 
switching cost is higher than 
̃ stay on the old tariff. We can see immediately that the number 
of switchers increases with the discount payment. In the remainder of this section we shall 
calculate the discount payment and the corresponding fraction of energy savers in various 
situations. Note that adding the switching cost 
∗ at the right-hand side of the previous 
inequality changes the interpretation without changing the value of 
̃(). 
∗  would be 
interpreted as the extra utility of not having to make effort to reduce consumption to ∗. 
To make all consumers switching to the electricity saving tariff, the firm should set its 
discount such that 
̃(∗) = , which leads to ∗ = ( − )∗. This situation is efficient for 
consumers since all win in the program, more particularly those for whom 
 > 0. The net 
utility of a consumer of type 
 is 	∗ − (1 + )∗ + ( − 
)∗ that is strictly greater than 
	∗ − (1 + )∗ for all 
. The firm’s profit takes the simple form ∗ − that is equal to 
(1 + )∗ − ∗ , namely the profit before it introduced its new tariff, less the amount 
∗. As we can see, unless it is subsidized, the firm will not offer ∗.  
 
Case 2 (monopoly). Let us now consider the case in which the firm behaves as a monopoly 
that wields some power over its customers. We denote by  the share of customers who stay 
on the old tariff and 1 −  as the fraction of consumers who opt for the energy-saving tariff. 
The share  of consumers who stay on the old tariff is given by: 
 12 


̃
= 12 −
1
2  +

∗  (2)  
                                                 
1
 I thank the referee for suggesting this simplifying assumption. 
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provided  ≥  +/∗. Since the firm serves all its customers, then 1 −  is equal to 1 
minus the above expression. These shares will depend on the value of  and  set by the firm. 
As suggested in the introduction, the own-price elasticity of electricity demand is generally 
small in the short run. Furthermore, given our assumption that 	∗ is constant (all consumers 
derive a satisfaction from the quantity they actually use, ∗), it is reasonable to assume that 
the monopolist maximizes its profit with respect to  where its profit is given by:2 
(1 + )∗ + (1 − )(∗ −). (3)  
The first order condition for profit maximization leads to: 
∗ = − + 2 ∗. (4)  
The discount payment is negative, meaning that consumers who switch to the new tariff are 
charged more. As 
̃(∗) = −/2, it follows that only those consumers who attach a high 
value to energy-saving will switch to the energy saving tariff. As the population of consumers 
is distributed on the interval [−, ] we can easily deduce that these consumers represent only 
one fourth of the total. One can also verify that the change in the firm’s profit is ∗/8. 
Thus, the firm can make profit by inducing only a small fraction of its consumers to save 
electricity. Taken together, these results would suggest that in the presence of pro-
environmental consumers, penalizing pricing structures may be more robust than rewarding 
ones in decentralized markets. Note that when switching costs approach zero, ∗ ↑ −∗, 
and 
̃(∗) ↑ 0. The extra charge applied to switchers approaches the levels of revenue lost on 
them, that is the monetary value of the electricity no longer wasted, ∗. 
We shall examine two further cases. The former (Case 3) is inspired by the 2008 decision 
by Canadian utility BC Hydro to introduce an energy-saving tariff that, as mentioned in our 
introduction, was revenue-neutral to it. Then we consider revenue-neutrality assuming the 
firm is emitting greenhouse gases, for which it is charged (Case 4).  
 
Case 3 (revenue-neutrality). Setting (3) equal to (1 + )∗ leads to ∗ = −∗. In this 
situation, half the consumers adopt the new tariff (
̃(∗) = 0). It transpires that this situation 
is also Pareto Optimal in that the discount payment maximizes the sum of consumers’ surplus 
and firm profit. Note that the result we obtain under revenue-neutrality is not only optimal but 
also distribution free in that it does not depend on the distribution that specifies the cost to 
consumers to save electricity. This qualitative result is similar to that found in Choe and 
Fraser (1999). However, in that paper all households make a positive waste reduction effort, 
implying that a first-best can only be achieved applying environmental tax and a waste 
collection charge to the firm. The optimal aspect of revenue-neutrality invites us to ask what 
would be the value of the optimal discount payment in the more realistic situation whereby 
the firm faces a cost for emitting greenhouse gases. 
 
                                                 
2
 In the concluding section, we discuss some implication of relaxing this assumption.  
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Case 4 (revenue-neutrality with a charge for greenhouse gas emissions). Let us therefore 
assume that ∗, the amount of waste before the introduction of the new tariff, produces a 
quantity %∗ (% < 1) of greenhouse gas emissions. And, denote ' the corresponding per unit 
price (' <  < ) which is exogenous. A rationale for considering ∗ as the only source of 
externalities is that this quantity is mostly produced from fossil-fuel plants, whereas ∗  is 
produced from say, nuclear plants. The firm’s profit is now: 
 
[(1 + )∗ − '%∗] + (1 − )(∗ −).  
 
Under the constraint that the firm keeps its revenue equal to (1 + )∗ − '%∗, we 
obtain ∗ = ('% − )∗. The discount payment is still negative but it leads to more energy 
conservation (
̃ = '% > 0). This shows that when the utility has to pay for its greenhouse gas 
emissions, its discount payment is still negative, but it is sufficiently low to induce a fraction 
of consumers who attach a negative value to the environment to save energy. We can compare 
this result with the effect of a charge for emissions when the firm behaves as a monopoly. The 
discount payment would increase and the marginal consumer would be 
̃ = ('% − )/2, the 
value of which depends on the magnitude of '.3 
4. Conclusion: discussion and extension 
The first policy implication relates to the rewarding-penalizing debate we introduced at the 
beginning of this paper. When mandatory to all customers (Case 1), rewarding tariffs 
compensate the deadweight loss of consumers who have to make an effort to use less 
electricity. Pro-environmental consumers on the other hand, win ‘twice’ under such programs, 
which may explain why profit-maximizing firms show some reluctance to use such tariffs. 
Unless firms attach a high positive value to the environment or are subsidized, which we have 
not considered here, this strategy is not sustainable. 
We considered neither entry by a new firm nor the cost to consumers to switch the 
incumbent. Regarding the decision of Poweo to introduce a discounted tariff provided 
consumers do not consume more than a contracted amount, our result suggest that this firm 
underestimated the effort consumers have to make to have control over their electricity 
consumption. In fact, in a decentralized environment and when the firm can perfectly 
discriminate between its customers (Case 2), it is optimal for it to penalize its 
environmentally-conscious customers, thus sacrificing environmental protection since only 
one-fourth of the consumers reduce their consumption. As we have shown in Case 4, 
                                                 
3
 As it is also the case in most countries that fossil-fuel power plants are a source of base load generation, more 
realism could be achieved by assuming that a fraction ( ∈ (0,1) of '%∗ is attributable to non-savers, while 
(1 − ()  to electricity savers. Solving the unconstrained-revenue monopolist problem in this case leads to 
different solutions: ∗ = *+,-. −  − (1 − ()'%/ ∗  and 
̃ = ('%(2( − 1) − )/2 . This reflects a lower 
incentive to the firm to attract its customers to the energy saving tariff. 
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however, charging the firm for its greenhouse gas emissions can improve the situation, for the 
introduction of such a charge forces the firm to induce a fraction of consumers to make 
positive efforts to conserve energy. But now there would be a trade-off between consumption 
efficiency and the deadweight loss due to switching, from those consumers who have to pay a 
cost to use less electricity. 
These results also lead us to discuss the usual assertion that measures designed to protect 
the environment imply sacrifices of one’s comfort (Hansla et al., 2008). The present model 
started with the reasonable assumption of a population of consumers, half of whom consider 
electricity saving as a sacrifice. Except in Case 4 there is no consumer sacrifice in the model, 
since consumers who reduce their electricity consumption are always those who attach a 
positive value (negative switching costs) to doing so. In this respect, our result in Case 3 is 
undoubtedly the most interesting as revenue-neutrality is both Pareto optimal and optimal to 
the firm. This suggests that having a high fraction of environmentally conscious consumers 
can make electricity saving possible. In policy implication terms this result argues in favor of 
increasing the share of environmentally conscious consumers by converting the others to 
switch to environment-friendly ways of using electricity. This undoubtedly requires changes 
in preferences as asserted by Stern (2008). This kind of psychological strategy is precisely 
what governments in many countries have been trying to achieve through conservation 
campaigns “. . . aimed at changing people’s knowledge, perceptions, motivations, cognitions 
and norms related to energy use and conservation.” (Steg, 2008, p. 4450; see also Banfi et al., 
2008, p. 515).  
The results of our model have relied on a one-period framework and a simple pricing 
structure. To assess their general application one could assume that U is a continuous 
function. If consumption is made up to the point where marginal willingness to pay is equal to 
price, then the optimal consumption level, ∗∗, would be such that 	() −  −  + 
( −
∗) reaches a maximum, with ∗ the level of electricity consumption when 
 ≤ 0. Ignoring 
further constraints, the first order condition is 	1(∗∗) =  − 
. It is worth noting that this 
point corresponds to a lower slope than the point ∗. Thus assuming a disutility to saving 
energy straight in the utility function can provide a simple explanation of why consumers 
resist saving electricity. We note however that for consumers whose effort to save electricity 
is high, marginal utility could be negative. The implication of this is left for future researches. 
Second, one could design a more sophisticated model with several competing firms that set 
the optimal level for more sophisticated tariff than that we have considered here. But, a 
further inertia that would then have to be considered is brand switching. 
Finally, one could consider a full contractual framework of the effort made by households 
to reduce electricity consumption. The problem could be one of hidden information where 
households keep their attitudes towards the environment secret. Moral hazard (hidden action) 
could also be an important issue here, although with today’s enabling technologies the firm 
can have at its disposal all the information regarding the volume of electricity used by its 
consumers. There is one item of information unlikely to be available to policy makers, and 
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that should be hard to contract for, namely electricity wastage which is set to remain a 
genuine impediment to energy conservation. 
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